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The book A critical overview of biological
functions is a short monograph by J. Garson,
which provides a survey of the views on bio-
logical functions in the analytic tradition of
philosophy. The notion of function is ubiq-
uitous in biology and all of its subfields. Be-
hind the notion of biological functions lurks
the shadow of final causes. Overcoming this
shadow is a challenge that has stimulated
many philosophers and the literature on this
topic is very rich. In the analytic tradition,
researchers focus on providing naturalized
accounts of functions. To do so, the main
difficulty is to provide accounts of functions
that exclude the use of final causes. The out-
come of this collective work is a diversity
of accounts of functions. Some of these ac-
counts are fairly recent while others have
been proposed several decades ago and are
the object of many discussions.
Overall, the author provides an impressive
and concise review of the debate on the var-
ious accounts of functions that are held by
recent and current philosophers. The focus
is on biological functions, and artifacts are
discussed only inasmuch as some accounts
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aim to theorize functions in both domains
together.The core chapters of the book, chap-
ters 2 to 6, focus on the different accounts of
functions. The first kind of accounts is dis-
cussed in chapter 2 and defines functions on
the basis of goal-directedness, either from a
behaviorist perspective in the case of Som-
merhoff and Braithwaite or from a mecha-
nistic perspective in the case of Nagel and
the cyberneticists. Both families of accounts
pertain to the history of philosophy in the
sense that they have been the object of severe
criticism and are no longer at the forefront
of current debates. A second approach is de-
veloped in chapter 3 and is called the selec-
tive account of function. This account builds
on the idea that a trait is functional when
it has been selected in a population. This
account has been introduced independently
by Neander and Millikan and has been fur-
ther developed by many philosophers such as
Godfrey-Smith and Griffiths. In chapter 4,
the author presents a third kind of accounts,
which aims to define the function of a trait
on the basis of its contribution to present
day fitness. Boorse’s account of function typ-
ically falls in this category. The fourth kind
of accounts, in chapter 5, grounds functions
on their causal role in a system.This view has
been introduced by Cummins and further
developed by Craver and Davies among oth-
ers. Last, chapter 6 presents three accounts
of functions that are more recent. In partic-
ular, the author discusses the organizational
account of functions sensu Moreno,Mossio
and Saborido, an account that this reviewer
contributed to develop. In a nutshell, this
account states that particular theoretical en-
tities that we call constraints are functional
when they are interdependent parts of an or-
ganized whole.
In providing this survey, the author adopts
a critical stance and he “make[s] no attempt
to conceal [his] own viewpoint or to pretend
to neutrality (p.11).” In spite of his defense of
pluralism, the author clearly favors the selec-
tive account of functions and the correspond-
ing chapter is more than twice longer than
the other chapters. This bias is not an issue
per se, especially because it is clearly stated in
the beginning of the book. Nevertheless, we
find that the motivations, the backgrounds
or the strengths of other accounts are not
as developed as their limitations. Sadly, this
restricts the interest of the book when con-
sidered as a survey. In spite of this weakness,
this book should be very helpful as a refer-
ence map of the accounts defended in cur-
rent literature and as an introduction to the
field.
In this context, the author discusses plu-
ralism where pluralism means that differ-
ent accounts of function may be simultane-
ously acceptable. He criticizes “‘between-
discipline pluralism,’ which seeks to restrict
the applicability of the selected effect theory
to some branches of evolutionary biology
(p.109).” We share the idea that functions
as selected effects are relevant to all fields
of biology including, for example, physiol-
ogy and development. Let us illustrate this
point with examples that are not covered in
the book. The notion of selective effect func-
tion is necessary to several biophysical mod-
els, which goes against the idea that these
models would be only about proximal causes
and would be independent or at least dis-
joint from ultimate causes. Let us mention
two examples. The first example comes from
the work of West, Brown and Enquist who
developed models of lung and vascular physi-
ology to understand allometric relationships
of the metabolism. In these models, the au-
thors assume that the function of lungs is to
exchange oxygen meaning that oxygen ex-
change rate have been optimized by natural
selection.This assumption is required for the
model to make predictions and reach its ex-
planatory aim. To understand the second ex-
ample, let us recall that two unrelated param-
eters, describing for instance the activation
energy of different molecules, cannot be as-
sumed to be equal without a reason. When
developing a model of chromatin published
in 2006, Lesne and Victor require such an
equality for the system to perform its func-
tion. Since this equality cannot be consid-
ered as the result of randomness, it is justified
on the ground of selection.
In spite of the relevance of selective effects
functions in other fields than evolutionary
biology, cross-disciplinary pluralism on ac-
counts of functions raises questions that are
not clearly solved. In particular, proving that
a trait clearly comes from selection is a diffi-
cult task and leads to a heavy epistemologi-
cal burden for fields which do not focus on
this very question. In the examples above,
selection is used to justify mathematical as-
sumptions but the validity of this rational is
not proven empirically. The author acknowl-
edges this difficulty but does not really hint
at solutions for practitioners.
The book uses a few running examples that
are biologically sound and help understand
the discourse without adding unnecessary
complexities. However, the commitment of
the author to the selective account of func-
tions can sometimes be misleading in the
treatment of these examples. For example,
the author considers absurd the notion that
the function of the nose is to support glasses.
The article “the” makes sense in the selective
account because this account focuses on the
historical origin of a trait. But from other
points of view, such as the organizational ac-
count of functions, a constraint may very well
have many functions, and it is fair to say that
a function of the nose is to support glasses for
some humans. Moreover, such statements
are at home, for example, in Lotka’s view that
a proper aspect of human evolution is a heavy
trend towards exosomatisation, that is to say,
the development of inorganic “organs” such
as glasses.
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We think that philosophical accounts of
functions in biology depend strongly on their
articulation to a theoretical framework. For
example, the emphasis on selection stems
from (Neo-) Darwinism. Similarly, the orga-
nizational account of function is based on a
series of work from Kauffman,Varela,Rosen,
among others, which aim to provide a theo-
retical account of the relationship between
the part and the whole, a central notion to
physiology. In this account, it is ultimately
the circularity in the interdependence of con-
straints that grounds functionality. Then, the
functionality holds with respect to this cir-
cularity: a part is functional for the larger
entity defined by the circularity considered
(Montévil &Mossio, 2015,Biological organ-
isation as closure of constraints). We fear
that the author missed this rationale when
designing counter-examples. For example,
he considered that obesity or panic attacks
are part of causal loops that ultimately main-
tain themselves and as a result would be func-
tional. This should be absurd because these
situations are pathological. However, these
circularities do not involve the “bulk” of the
organism and, as such, it is not sound to call
them functional for the organism in the orga-
nizational account. Moreover, it is not clear
whether they are constraints sensu Montévil
& Mossio.
Overall this book provides a good intro-
duction to the debate on functions in analytic
philosophy, and our criticism should be miti-
gated by the breadth of the literature consid-
ered and the short size of the book. We ad-
vise it mostly for a philosophical readership,
as a map of the field. It is also possible for
the philosophically-inclined biology teacher
to use it as a reference when aiming to dispel
the specter of final causes in her teaching,
although this readership is clearly not the
main target of this book.
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